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Preface 
Three years ago, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled in the National Grid Indus 
case (C-371/10) on exit taxation of companies transferring their real seat to another EU 
Member State. The Courts’ ruling illustrated that exit taxes of many EU Member States 
infringed the freedom of establishment as enshrined in Articles 49 – 55 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and in Articles 31 - 35 of the Agreement on the European 
Economic Area. In later case-law, both the Court of Justice of the EU and the EFTA Court 
clarified what requirements national tax laws must meet in respect of the transfer of 
residence of companies to be in line with EU/EEA law.  
An important recent ruling in this respect dates from 23 January 2014. In the DMC case     
(C-164/12) the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled on the contribution of a 
participation in a limited partnership to a limited liability company. Although this case did not 
regard the transfer of seat of a company, from the wording of the Court it seems to follow that 
this ruling has impact as well on exit taxation, in particular on the possibilities for Member 
States to require guarantees and on the possibilities to collect exit taxes in fixed annual 
installments. The Court of Justice of the European Union did not yet have the opportunity to 
rule on a case in which a Member State charges interest payments in respect of deferred 
payment of exit taxes. At present, this seems to be the main element of exit taxation that has 
not yet been dealt with by the Court. 
The European case law on exit taxation has matured. The question is to what extent the EU 
and EEA Member States have implemented this case-law in their national laws. The 
Radboud University Nijmegen and Deloitte have cooperated in this study examining to what 
extent the national tax laws existing as per 1 January 2014 are in line with the case-law of 
the European Court of Justice and of the EFTA Court. Dr. Harm van den Broek, associate 
professor at Radboud University Nijmegen and of counsel to the EU Tax Team of Deloitte in 
the Netherlands, prepared the questionnaire on the basis of which national experts of the 
Deloitte Member Firms in the EU and EEA Member States have written their country reports. 
Dr. Harm van den Broek wrote the analyses and conclusions as regards the compatibility of 
national tax laws on exit taxation with EU/EEA law.  
With regard to the outcome of the survey, I consider it striking to see how many Member 
States (at least 13) still fail to comply with the National Grid Indus ruling and continue to 
apply tax laws that infringe the freedom of establishment. With regard to the requirement to 
pay interest it seems that the tax laws of many EU Member States are not yet EU proof. 
In December 2013, the EFTA Court ruled in case EFTA Surveillance Authority vs. Iceland 
(case E-13/12) that also exit taxation levied in occasion of cross-border mergers infringes the 
freedom of establishment. This ruling promises to be the first of a new line-up of cases 
concerning cross-border reorganizations. That (future) case-law concerning cross-border 
mergers and divisions will require amendment of many national tax laws as well.  
Our thanks go to dr. Harm van den Broek and to all Deloitte national reporters, who 
generously invested their time and efforts to bring this study to a success. Their contact 
details can be found in the annex to the report.  
Rotterdam, November 2014 
Prof. dr. P. Kavelaars 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Transfers of Seat and Exit Taxation 
Daily Mail1 was the first case in which the European Court of Justice ruled on the applicability 
of the freedom of establishment on transfers of seats of companies. Afterwards, many other 
cases followed. After this first ruling, for a long time it remained unclear to what extent 
migrating companies can rely on their freedom of establishment. Subsequent case law, such 
as Überseering2,  made it clear that the host state must recognize the legal capacity of a 
company that has transferred its real seat to another EU Member State while retaining its 
status of company established under the laws of its state of origin. Cartesio3, by contrast, 
pointed out that the existence of a company under its national laws of establishment, is a 
preliminary condition to be able to rely on the freedom of establishment in case of a transfer 
of seat. Therefore, in principle, a company which under its law of incorporation does not have 
the possibility to transfer its real seat to another Member State while maintaining its status of 
company governed by the law of the state of origin cannot rely on the freedom of 
establishment. According to Cartesio, this may be different if the host state would allow the 
company transferring its real seat to convert into a company governed by the laws of the host 
state. In such case, the company can rely on the freedom of establishment as well. And 
Vale4, finally clarified that if the host state allows domestic conversions of companies, in 
principle the freedom of establishment requires that also comparable inbound seat transfers 
plus subsequent conversions of foreign companies into companies governed under the laws 
of the host state must be allowed. Finally, in National Grid Indus5, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union took away all remaining doubts and ruled that a company that exercises its 
freedom of establishment by transferring its real seat abroad may also rely on the freedom of 
establishment in respect of exit taxation. Exit taxes must be in line with the freedom of 
establishment.  
1.2 Scope of the Research 
The present study examines to what extent exit taxation in respect of companies that transfer 
their real seat to other EU or EEA Member States is in line with the freedom of 
establishment. The research is limited to issues of Corporate Income Tax levied in respect of 
legal entities in case of seat transfers. The scope of this survey does not include: 
- Migrations of individual shareholders;6 
- Migrations of individuals who run a non-incorporated business activity;7  
- The transfer of assets from of permanent establishment to a foreign head office or 
vice versa;8 
- Cross-border Mergers or Divisions.9 
 
                                                          
1
 ECJ case 81/87 (Daily Mail).  
2
 ECJ case C-208/00 (Überseering). 
3
 ECJ case C-210/06 (Cartesio). 
4
 ECJ case C-378/10 (Vale). 
5
 ECJ case C-371/10 (National Grid Indus). 
6
 E.g. ECJ case C-9/02 (N). 
7
 E.g. ECJ case C-301/11 (Commission vs. the Netherlands). 
8
 E.g. ECJ case C-38/10 (Commission vs. Portugal). 
9
 E.g. EFTA Court case E-14/13 (EFTA Surveillance Authority vs. Iceland). 
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1.3 Methodology 
This report is based on a country survey with national reports from country experts and 
reflects the legislation as per 1 January 2014. This report contains the analysis of the 
national country reports of the 28 EU Member States plus two Member States of the 
European Economic Area (Norway and Iceland).10 
The questions of the survey, and consequently the country reports, are aligned with the 
method in which the European Court of Justice assesses whether national laws are in line 
with the fundamental freedoms.11 The Court applies a four-step approach, examining the 
following questions: 
1. Do the persons involved have access to one of the Treaty freedoms? 
2. Do the national laws involved discriminate on the basis of nationality or restrict the 
exercise of the Treaty freedoms? 
3. Can the restriction of the Treaty freedoms be justified? 
4. Do the national laws go beyond what is necessary and are they adequate to obtain 
their objective? 
These questions are elaborated in the report as follows. 
Whether companies that transfer their seat to another EU or EEA Member State can rely on 
the freedom of establishment depends in part on the national company law system of their 
state of incorporation. This question is examined in para. 2. 
The study continues with an examination in para. 3 of the question to what extent exit 
taxation restricts the freedom of establishment. To what extent does it result in a more 
burdensome tax treatment than in comparable domestic situations? Are there any grounds to 
justify exit taxation? 
The questions to what extent exit taxation is proportionate is divided in various sub 
questions. In the first place, can the collection of exit taxation be deferred until the capital 
gains are realized or is it possible to pay the exit tax in annual installments (para. 4)? In the 
second place, do Member States require from taxpayers to provide guarantees as a 
condition to obtain deferred tax collection (para. 5)? And in the third place, do states charge 
late payment interest in respect of deferred collection of exit taxes (para 6)?  
In the end, para. 7 contains the conclusions and summary of the research.  
The List of Correspondents can be found in the Annex. 
 
 
  
                                                          
10
 Since Deloitte does not have an office in Liechtenstein, the third EEA Member State, this report does not 
contain a country report in respect of Liechtenstein. 
11
 ECJ case C-55/94 (Gebhard). 
9 
 
2 Access to the Freedom of Establishment:  applicable Company Law System 
In order to examine whether national laws on exit taxation infringe the freedom of 
establishment, an underlying question needs to be addressed:  what company law system 
applies in the Member State at hand, the incorporation system or the real seat system? 
After the transfer of the real seat of a company established under the incorporation system, 
the company law of the state of origin generally continues to apply and the company 
continues to exist as a legal entity under its law of incorporation. Consequently, the company 
can challenge in court disproportionate forms of exit taxation. 
By contrast, after the transfer of the real seat of a company established under the real seat 
system, the company law of the state of origin does not continue to apply. The company 
loses its status of a company governed by the laws of the state of incorporation. As ultimate 
consequence, the company must be liquidated. Its assets are sold, its creditors are paid, and 
remaining cash is distributed to the shareholders. The company ceases to exist as a legal 
entity and consequently it can no longer rely on the freedom of establishment.12 The 
company cannot successfully challenge in court any form of exit taxation.  
In practice, the distinction between the incorporation system and the real seat system may 
be less explicit. Arcade Drilling13 regarded a Norwegian company transferring its seat to the 
United Kingdom. The Oslo Court was not certain whether Norway applied the real seat 
system or the incorporation system and whether the migrating company was obliged to 
liquidate. The EFTA Court found that, in practice, even 10 years after its transfer of seat, the 
company still existed and had not been forced to liquidate. Under such circumstance, the 
company could (still) rely on its freedom of establishment. 
In its Cartesio and Vale rulings14, the EU Court of Justice has further mitigated the 
consequences of the real seat system in case of the transfer of seat of the company. The 
freedom of establishment may require that the state of origin and the host state allow the 
conversion of the migrating company into a company governed by the company laws of the 
host state.15 In that case, the company is not obliged to liquidate and to pay its creditors 
immediately, instead it continues to exist. It will be subject to the company laws of another 
state (the host state) and receives a new company statute. 
In case of a conversion, the company continues to exist as a legal person, even if it will have 
new articles of incorporation. Therefore, the preliminary requirement for entitlement to the 
freedom of establishment is met. The company can rely on the freedom of establishment. 
One of the consequences, not yet dealt with by the EU Court of Justice, would be that in 
occasion of a cross-border conversion the company can successfully challenge 
disproportionate forms of exit taxation.  
Apart from the possibilities of a conversion, for exit tax purposes it is therefore relevant 
whether a migrating company is subject to the real seat system or the incorporation system. 
                                                          
12
 ECJ case 81/87 (Daily Mail); ECJ case C-210/06 (Cartesio). 
13
 EFTA Court case E-15/11 (Arcade Drilling AS). 
14
 ECJ case C-210/06 (Cartesio); ECJ case C-378/10 (Vale). 
15
 If the host state and the state of origin allow their companies to participate in a domestic conversion of one 
company type into another company type, then they are obliged to recognize the conversion into or from a 
similar company type of another Member State. 
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Table 1 below indicates which company law system the Member States of the EU and of the 
EEA apply.  
Tabel 1   Applicable Company Law System 
 
EU Member State 
 
 
 
Real Seat 
System 
 
Incorporation 
System 
 
Austria x   
Belgium x   
Bulgaria   x 
Croatia   x 
Cyprus   x 
Czech Republic   x 
Denmark   x 
Estonia   x 
Finland   x 
France x   
Germany   x 
Greece x   
Hungary   x 
Ireland   x 
Italy   x 
Latvia x   
Lithuania   x 
Luxembourg x   
Malta   x 
The Netherlands   x 
Poland   x 
Portugal   x 
Romania   x 
Slovakia   x 
Slovenia x   
Spain   x 
Sweden   x 
United Kingdom   x 
      
EEA Member State     
Iceland   x 
Norway not clear   
 
From Table 1 it follows that the vast majority of EU and EEA Member States (22 states) 
applies the incorporation system.  
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The number of states adhering to the real seat system (7 states) can however not be 
neglected. According to a traditional interpretation of the real seat system, companies 
transferring their seat abroad should be liquidated (Austria, Luxembourg). Those companies 
cease to exist and cannot rely on the freedom of establishment. There is however a tendency 
in Member States to mitigate the consequences of seat transfers. In the follow-up of the 
Cartesio and Vale rulings, several states have introduced provisions on the conversion of 
companies. Other states, like Germany, have recently shifted from the real seat system to 
the incorporation system. As a result of these developments less frequently companies from 
real seat states transferring their actual seat abroad are obliged to liquidate. It occurs more 
often that such companies can convert and continue to exist. Consequently, they can rely on 
the freedom of establishment. This means that they can also challenge in court exit taxation. 
Finally, sometimes it is unclear which company law system applies (e.g. Norway).16 In that 
case there is no relevant case law on seat transfers and the legal doctrine is divided.  
  
                                                          
16
 Cfr. EFTA Court case E-15/11 (Arcade Drilling AS). 
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3 Taxation of Unrealized Capital Gains:  a Restriction of the Freedom of 
Establishment that may be Justified 
3.1 Introduction 
Whereas the freedom of establishment applies, it is infringed in case of discrimination on the 
basis of nationality or in case of measures which make the establishment in other Member 
States less attractive compared to purely domestic situations. For this test it is crucial to find 
the adequate comparable domestic situation. Often this is not easy. States that apply an 
inadequate comparable may draw incorrect conclusions as to the compatibility of their 
legislation with the freedom of establishment.  
The freedom of establishment appears to be restricted if a cross-border situation is treated 
more burdensome than purely domestic situations. It is therefore relevant to examine to what 
extent unrealized capital gains are subject to tax in both situations. The outcomes of this 
comparison are illustrated in Table 2. 
3.2 The Comparable Domestic Situation 
In National Grid Indus, the European Court of Justice assessed the Dutch exit tax levied from 
companies transferring their real seat from the Netherlands to another EU Member State. 
Such companies maintain their status as a company governed by Dutch company law and 
continue to exist as legal entity.  
The Court ruled that a levy on unrealized capital gains of companies that transfer their real 
seat abroad does not constitute discrimination on the basis of nationality. The exit tax does 
not discriminate against companies established under the laws of other EU Member States. 
The exit tax applies irrespective of the nationality of the legal entity involved. In fact, in most 
cases the companies that are affected by the Dutch exit tax rules are companies established 
under Dutch law.  
The exit tax rather puts companies which are actually located in the Netherlands and which 
transfer their real seat abroad at a disadvantage compared to situations of resident 
companies that do not transfer their real seat abroad. The exit tax, therefore, does generally 
not affect the tax position of foreign taxpayers but instead the tax position of a states’ own 
taxpayers which exercise their freedom of establishment.  
The Court of Justice ruled as follows: 
‘37.  In the case in the main proceedings, it is clear that a company incorporated 
under Netherlands law wishing to transfer its place of effective management outside 
Netherlands territory, in the exercise of its right guaranteed by Article 49 TFEU, is 
placed at a disadvantage in terms of cash flow compared to a similar company 
retaining its place of effective management in the Netherlands. In accordance 
with the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, the transfer of the place 
of effective management of a Netherlands company to another Member State entails 
the immediate taxation of the unrealised capital gains relating to the assets 
transferred, whereas such gains are not taxed when such a company transfers its 
place of management within the Netherlands.  (…) 
38      That difference of treatment cannot be explained by an objective difference of 
situation. From the point of view of legislation of a Member State aiming to tax capital 
14 
 
gains generated in its territory, the situation of a company incorporated under the 
law of that Member State which transfers its place of management to another Member 
State is similar to that of a company also incorporated under the law of the 
former Member State which keeps its place of management in that Member 
State, as regards the taxation of the capital gains relating to the assets which were 
generated in the former Member State before the transfer of the place of 
management.’ [emphasis added]. 
The Court of Justice has therefore ruled that with regard to exit taxation, a company 
transferring its seat abroad must be compared with a company which keeps its place of 
management within the same Member State. In National Grid Indus, the Court of Justice has 
repeated several times what the basis is for the appropriate comparison:  a company which 
retains its place of effective management in the same state of origin.  
What does this comparison mean in practice? In National Grid Indus, the Court explained the 
tax treatment of Dutch companies which keep their place of effective management in the 
Netherlands:  
‘37.  (…) The capital gains relating to the assets of a company transferring its place of 
management within the Netherlands are not taxed until they are actually realised and 
to the extent that they are realised.  
40     (…) Such an unrealised capital gain would not have been taxed if National 
Grid Indus had transferred its place of effective management within Netherlands 
territory.’ [emphasis added]. 
The Court of Justice has made clear that transfers of seat must be compared to domestic 
situations in which a company retains its place of management in the state of origin and in 
which the company’s unrealized capital gains are not taxed. Therefore, any tax treatment of 
cross-border transfers of seat that is more burdensome in respect of the taxation of 
unrealized capital gains constitutes in principle a restriction of the freedom of establishment. 
3.3 A Restriction of the Freedom of Establishment 
Furthermore, the Court indicates in what situations the exercise of the freedom of 
establishment is restricted.  
‘36      It is also settled case-law that all measures which prohibit, impede or 
render less attractive the exercise of the freedom of establishment must be 
regarded as restrictions on that freedom’ [emphasis added]. 
It is important to notice that the Court of Justice rules not only with regard to certain specific 
tax measures, but refers to all measures which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the 
exercise of the freedom of establishment: they must be regarded as restrictions on that 
freedom. The Court refers to its ‘settled case-law’ in respect of measures which can 
constitute restrictions.  
Therefore, we must conclude that all measures which render less attractive the transfer of 
the management of the company to another Member State in comparison to companies 
which retain their real seat in the state of origin constitute restrictions of that freedom. 
According to settled case-law, a restriction of freedom of establishment is permissible only if 
it is justified by overriding reasons in the public interest. It is further necessary, in such a 
15 
 
case, that the measure should be appropriate to ensuring the attainment of the objective in 
question and not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective.17    
In National Grid Indus, only one of the measures which prohibit, impede or render less 
attractive the transfer of the management of the company to another Member State was at 
stake:  
‘37      In the case in the main proceedings, it is clear that a company incorporated 
under Netherlands law wishing to transfer its place of effective management outside 
Netherlands territory, in the exercise of its right guaranteed by Article 49 TFEU, is 
placed at a disadvantage in terms of cash flow compared to a similar company 
retaining its place of effective management in the Netherlands. In accordance with the 
national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, the transfer of the place of 
effective management of a Netherlands company to another Member State entails 
the immediate taxation of the unrealised capital gains relating to the assets 
transferred, whereas such gains are not taxed when such a company transfers its 
place of management within the Netherlands. The capital gains relating to the assets 
of a company transferring its place of management within the Netherlands are not 
taxed until they are actually realised and to the extent that they are realised. That 
difference of treatment relating to the taxation of capital gains is liable to deter a 
company incorporated under Netherlands law from transferring its place of 
management to another Member State’ [emphasis added]. 
The Court of Justice ruled that the immediate taxation of unrealized capital gains resulted in 
a disadvantage in terms of cash flow. This measure is forbidden unless it can be justified by 
overriding reasons in the public interest. 
Other existing Dutch measures connected with the transfer of the seat abroad were not at 
stake in the specific case of National Grid Indus, such as the winding up of tax exempt 
reserves. However, from the above cited para. 36 of National Grid Indus it follows that also 
the winding up and taxation of reserves constitutes a restriction of the freedom of 
establishment to the extent that this would not occur in domestic situations. 
3.4 Do all Seat Transfers result in a Restriction? Comparison with Domestic 
Situations 
Taxation of unrealized capital gains in occasion of a transfer of seat only constitutes a 
restriction of the freedom of establishment if, like in the National Grid Indus case, there is a 
different, less favourable treatment and similar unrealized capital gains are not (yet) subject 
to taxation in domestic situations. 
If, by contrast, in a specific state, at the end of each fiscal year the unrealized capital gains of 
resident companies are also taxed in purely domestic situations, then exit taxation upon a 
transfer of seat is not a ‘measure which prohibits, impedes or renders less attractive the 
exercise of the freedom of establishment’.  
  
                                                          
17
 ECJ case C-371/10 (National Grid Indus) para. 42. 
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The transfer of seat does not result in any disadvantage, because all unrealized capital gains 
are subject to tax at the end of a fiscal year. In such case, the seat transfer does not result in 
a cash-flow disadvantage. This was the view that the Italian Government put forward in the 
National Grid Indus case.18  
‘64.      The Italian Government considers that the Court’s case-law relating to exit 
taxation of natural persons is not applicable to exit taxation of undertakings because 
natural persons and undertakings are fundamentally subject to different tax regimes. 
Whereas, in the case of natural persons, in principle only the actual income is taxed, 
undertakings are taxed on the basis of a balance sheet showing assets and 
liabilities. Increased values of assets are in principle directly reflected in the 
balance sheet and are therefore taxable immediately. Only exceptionally can the 
original value of an asset be maintained in the accounts until the unrealised capital 
gains are realized (…).’ [emphasis added]. 
According to the Italian Government, in case of undertakings ‘increased values of assets are 
in principle directly reflected in the balance sheet and are therefore taxable immediately.’ 
Theoretically, if in a specific state the tax system would actually work in such way, then 
indeed exit taxation would not result in any disadvantage compared to domestic situations.  
In this exit tax survey, it is therefore relevant to understand whether and to what extent 
unrealized capital gains of companies are subject to tax in purely domestic situations and to 
what extent there is a difference in treatment with cross-border transfers of seat. From the 
next paragraph it follows that reality differs from what the Italian Government assumes. 
3.5 The Outcome of the Comparative Survey 
Table 2 demonstrates to what extent unrealized capital gains are subject to tax in domestic 
situations at the end of the fiscal year and in situations of a cross-border transfer of seat. If 
unrealized capital gains are subject to tax in case of a transfer of seat whereas they are not 
(yet) subject to tax in domestic situations, this different tax treatment makes it less attractive 
to transfer the seat of a company abroad. This qualifies as a restriction and potential 
infringement of the freedom of establishment.  
 
 
  
                                                          
18
 Referred to by Advocate General Kokott in her Opinion, case C-371/10 (National Grid Indus)  para. 64. 
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Table 2  Taxation of unrealized capital gains in domestic situations and on transfers of  
seat 
EU State 
 
 
  
Tax on unrealized 
gains in domestic 
situations 
Tax on unrealized 
gains in seat 
transfer 
Potential 
infringement 
 
Austria no in specific cases yes 
Belgium no yes yes 
Bulgaria no no no 
Croatia no no no 
Cyprus no no no 
Czech 
Republic in specific cases in specific cases no 
Denmark in specific cases yes yes 
Estonia no no no 
Finland no yes (SEs) yes 
France in specific cases yes yes 
Germany no yes yes 
Greece in specific cases not clear not clear 
Hungary no no no 
Ireland no yes (exceptions) yes 
Italy no yes yes 
Latvia no no no 
Lithuania no not clear not clear 
Luxembourg no yes yes 
Malta no no no 
The 
Netherlands no yes yes 
Poland no no no 
Portugal in specific cases yes yes 
Romania no no no 
Slovakia no yes yes 
Slovenia no no no 
Spain no yes yes 
Sweden in specific cases yes yes 
United 
Kingdom no yes yes 
        
EEA States 
  
  
Iceland no not clear not clear 
Norway no yes yes 
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Table 2 illustrates that not a single state generally taxes unrealized capital gains of 
companies in domestic situations at the end of a fiscal year. A few Member States19 levy tax 
on very specific unrealized capital gains in domestic situations, e.g. on publicly traded 
securities or foreign currency. These are, however, exceptions. States do generally not levy 
tax on unrealized capital gains in domestic situations. The justification put forward by Italy as 
referred to in paragraph 3.4 is therefore in contrast with the facts. 
The second conclusion that can be drawn from Table 2 is that a large number of states (17 
states) levies exit taxes after a transfer of seat of companies.20 Only in the Czech Republic 
unrealized capital gains on specific assets are taxed both in domestic situations and upon 
transfers of seat. All other 16 states tax unrealized capital gains upon a seat transfer 
whereas these unrealized gains would not have been taxed in domestic situations. These 16 
states potentially restrict the freedom of establishment.21 Consequently, their exit taxes are 
prohibited unless they can be justified. Most of these states have specific exit tax provisions. 
Some states tax unrealized capital gains on the basis of other tax principles, such as transfer 
pricing legislation.22  
As third conclusion, there is a remarkable number of 10 states that does not levy any form of 
exit tax on unrealized capital gains. Apparently these Member States do not consider it 
indispensable to charge exit taxes. 
Finally, Greece, Lithuania and Iceland do not have specific exit tax legislation and it is not 
clear whether the general principles of their tax laws would require taxation of unrealized 
capital gains upon a transfer of seat. 
3.6 Justification of Exit Taxation 
In National Grid Indus, the Court of Justice has ruled that exit taxation may be justified by the 
need to divide the power to tax between Member States and to preserve the coherence of 
the national tax system, provided that the legislative measures are proportionate.23 After the 
Court’s previous rulings in the cases Lasteyrie du Saillant and N24 this outcome in not very 
surprising and does not need much further comments. The next paragraphs examine 
whether the corporate exit tax provisions of the EU and EEA Member States meet the 
proportionality requirement. 
 
 
  
                                                          
19
 Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Portugal and Sweden. 
20
 Certain states, e.g. Austria, Finland, Ireland and Luxembourg only levy exit taxes in specific situations. 
21
 Provided the migrating company involved can rely on the freedom of establishment. 
22
 E.g. Slovakia. 
23
 ECJ case C-371/10 (National Grid Indus)  paras. 73, 80. 
24
 ECJ case C-9/02 (Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant); ECJ case C-470/04 (N.). 
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4 Collection of Exit Taxes 
4.1 Deferral until Realization 
In National Grid Indus the Court of Justice had ruled that the Dutch exit taxes infringed the 
freedom of establishment and could not be justified. In domestic situations, capital gains 
would not have been taxed until their realization. In general, imposing a tax assessment 
upon the transfer of seat could be justified in order to divide the power to tax between 
Member States and in order to maintain the coherence of the tax system. However, 
immediate tax collection without the option of tax collection at the moment of realization 
could not be justified. The Court ruled as follows. 
“46     The transfer of the place of effective management of a company of one 
Member State to another Member State cannot mean that the Member State of origin 
has to abandon its right to tax a capital gain which arose within the ambit of its 
powers of taxation before the transfer (…). The Court has thus held that, in 
accordance with the principle of fiscal territoriality linked to a temporal component, 
namely the taxpayer’s residence for tax purposes within national territory during the 
period in which the capital gains arise, a Member State is entitled to charge tax on 
those gains at the time when the taxpayer leaves the country (…). Such a 
measure is intended to prevent situations capable of jeopardising the right of the 
Member State of origin to exercise its powers of taxation in relation to activities 
carried on in its territory, and may therefore be justified on grounds connected with 
the preservation of the allocation of powers of taxation between the Member States 
(…). 
64    It follows from the foregoing that Article 49 TFEU does not preclude legislation of 
a Member State under which the amount of tax on unrealised capital gains 
relating to a company’s assets is fixed definitively (…) at the time when the 
company, because of the transfer of its place of effective management to 
another Member State, ceases to obtain profits taxable in the former Member State 
(…). 
73     In those circumstances, national legislation offering a company transferring 
its place of effective management to another Member State the choice between, 
first, immediate payment of the amount of tax, which creates a disadvantage for 
that company in terms of cash flow but frees it from subsequent administrative 
burdens, and, secondly, deferred payment of the amount of tax, possibly together 
with interest in accordance with the applicable national legislation, which necessarily 
involves an administrative burden for the company in connection with tracing the 
transferred assets, would constitute a measure which, while being appropriate for 
ensuring the balanced allocation of powers of taxation between the Member States, 
would be less harmful to freedom of establishment than the measure at issue in the 
main proceedings.” [emphasis added]. 
The Court ruled that exit tax provisions may not go beyond what is necessary to obtain the 
objectives of maintaining a balanced allocation of taxing powers between Member States 
and preserving the coherence of the tax system.  
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These objectives are obtained by fixing definitively the amount of tax on unrealised capital 
gains at the moment the company transfers its seat abroad. The requirement of immediate 
tax collection is not necessary in order to obtain these objectives.  
The Court qualifies immediate tax collection as ‘harmful to freedom of establishment’ 
because it generates a cash-flow disadvantage compared to domestic companies.25  
“37      (…) it is clear that a company incorporated under Netherlands law wishing 
to transfer its place of effective management outside Netherlands territory (…) 
is placed at a disadvantage in terms of cash flow compared to a similar company 
retaining its place of effective management in the Netherlands (…) the transfer of the 
place of effective management of a Netherlands company to another Member State 
entails the immediate taxation of the unrealised capital gains relating to the assets 
transferred, whereas such gains are not taxed when such a company transfers its 
place of management within the Netherlands. The capital gains relating to the assets 
of a company transferring its place of management within the Netherlands are not 
taxed until they are actually realised and to the extent that they are realized (…).  
68      On this point, it must be stated that recovery of the tax debt at the time of 
the actual realisation in the host Member State of the asset in respect of which a 
capital gain was established by the authorities of the Member State of origin on the 
occasion of the transfer of a company’s place of effective management to the host 
Member State may avoid the cash-flow problems which could be produced by the 
immediate recovery of the tax due on unrealised capital gains.” [emphasis added]. 
From these paragraphs it can be inferred what the Court holds about the recovery of exit 
taxes. The proportionality principle requires in this respect that migrating companies are 
treated in the same way (or at least not in a more burdensome way) compared to domestic 
companies which have not (yet) realized their hidden reserves. Member States should grant 
companies the option to defer the payment of exit taxes until the moment of realization of the 
capital gains. Table 3 in para. 4.3 indicates to what extent Member States that impose exit 
taxes grant the possibility to defer the payment of exit taxes until the moment of realization.  
In practice, certain types of assets are usually not disposed of. The option of ‘deferral until 
realisation’ as offered by the Court of Justice would be of not much use. Para. 4.2 deals with 
the question whether there can be other proportionate ways and moments to collect exit 
taxes. 
4.2 Payment in Fixed Annual Installments 
4.2.1 A Lack of Realization 
In the case Commission vs. Denmark26, the question rose at what moment exit taxes may be 
collected in case of assets other than financial assets, in particular assets which usually are 
not disposed of and consequently capital gains which are not actually realized.  
  
                                                          
25
 ECJ case C-371/10 (National Grid Indus)  para. 73.  
26
 ECJ case C-261/11 (Commission vs. Denmark). Ruling only available in French and Danish. 
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Under Danish tax law, assets that were transferred from a Danish branch to a foreign branch 
were deemed to be disposed of at fair market value.27 The Court of Justice ruled that in 
respect of assets that generally were not meant to be disposed of, Member States are 
allowed to establish another criterion in order to determine the moment that the exit tax, 
which is triggered by a transfer of seat, is collected.  
´35 At the outset it must be noted that the scope of the principle enunciated in 
National Grid Indus, supra, is not limited to unrealized capital gains accrued on the 
territory of a Member State and realized after the transfer of assets to another 
Member State (see Case National Grid Indus, supra, paras 68 and 70). 
36 Furthermore, it should be noted that, since the amount of tax on unrealized capital 
gains relating to the assets is finally determined when a company transfers the assets 
to another Member State, the fact that some of said assets cannot be sold after their 
transfer to the receiving State does not, in itself, deprive the State of origin of the 
possibility of recovering such amount. 
37 Indeed, the Member States are entitled to tax capital gains that were generated 
while the assets in question were on their territory and have the power to provide, 
for the purpose of such imposition, for a generator other than the actual disposal 
to ensure the taxation of assets that are not held for sale, and which is less intrusive 
to the freedom of establishment than the collection at the time of the transfer.’28 
[emphasis added] 
Also in DMC, the Court held that even if certain assets will not be realized after their transfer 
abroad, that does not mean that the Member State involved will lose its right to collect the 
tax. 
“53  On the other hand, Member States entitled to tax capital gains generated when 
the assets in question were in their territory have the power, for the purposes of such 
taxation, to make provision for a chargeable event other than the actual 
realisation of those gains, in order ensure that those assets are taxed (see, to that 
effect, Case 261/11 Commission v Denmark [2013] ECR, paragraph 37)”.29 [emphasis 
added] 
In Commission vs. Denmark, the Court does not specify what type of facts, other than the 
actual realization of the capital gains, could trigger tax collection. In para 38 of that ruling, 
however, the Court suggests that the solutions which Member States choose may differ and 
do not necessarily have to be the same as the solutions which will be chosen by Denmark. 
As the Court ruled in Commission vs. Denmark, par. 37 cited above, such rules containing 
alternative collection-triggering-facts should have the objective:   
“37 (….) to ensure the taxation of assets that are not held for sale” [emphasis 
added].30 
  
                                                          
27
 ECJ case C-261/11 (Commission vs. Denmark) para. 3. Ruling only available in French and Danish. 
28
 Original text only available in French and Danish. Translation from French by Harm van den Broek. 
29
 ECJ case C-164/12 (DMC) para. 53. 
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 Translation from French by Harm van den Broek. 
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In order to make sure that exit tax can also be collected in respect of assets which do not 
have a ‘realization moment’ the Court allows to collect the exit tax in respect of those assets 
at a different moment. One might wonder whether such alternative collection-triggering-facts 
may be applied to all assets or only to those assets which, given their nature, are not meant 
to be disposed of. If we take into account the specific objective for such rules mentioned by 
the Court in Commission vs. Denmark, it would only be necessary to apply these alternative 
collection-triggering-facts to those assets which are not meant to be disposed of. Tax 
collection in respect of the other assets, which are meant to be disposed of, could occur in 
line with the National Grid Indus ruling at the moment of realization of the capital gains. The 
Court does not generally state that for all types of assets Member States may deviate from 
the rules created in National Grid Indus which require that that, as an option, collection 
should be deferred until the moment of realization. Consequently, the exception laid down in 
Commission vs. Denmark, seems to apply only to ‘assets that are not held for sale’ and that 
do not have a ‘realization moment’. Under this interpretation, tax in respect of other assets 
may only be collected when the gains are realized. The second question that arises is how it 
can be determined whether these rules that provide for alternative tax-collection-generators 
are proportionate. In this respect the Court fails to provide any indication. 
In DMC, par. 53, supra, the ECJ cites para. 37 of Commission vs. Denmark, in which the 
Court allowed to apply alternative moments of tax collection instead of the moment of 
realization. It is remarkable, however, that in this citation the ECJ skips the phrase that such 
alternative moments of collection should ensure the collection of tax in respect of ‘assets that 
are not held for sale.’ Does this indicate that the Member States are in general and in respect 
of all types of assets allowed to refrain from collecting the exit tax at the moment of 
realization and are they generally allowed to provide for alternative moments of tax 
collection? Does they ECJ wish to further liberalize its exit tax case law? Why would the 
Court make such a step which serves no clear purpose? 
4.2.2 Payment in Fixed Annual Installments 
After National Grid Indus, several Member States have introduced general arrangements 
providing to collect the entire exit tax in fixed annual installments (see Table 3 in par. 4.3). 
The question is whether this way of collection of exit taxes is allowed under the freedom of 
establishment.31 A similar question was at stake in the DMC case. 
In 2014, the Court of Justice ruled in the DMC case32 on the collection of German corporate 
income tax in fixed installments in case of the contribution by two Austrian companies 
(GmbHs) of their participation (as limited partners) in a German limited partnership (GmbH & 
Co KG) to a German limited liability company (GmbH).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31
 Since December 2013, there is a case pending for the ECJ in respect of the German exit tax levied after a seat 
transfer which must be paid in fixed annual installments  (ECJ case C-657/13, LabTec). 
32
 ECJ case C-164/12 (DMC). 
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As a result of the contribution of their participations, which for German tax purposes qualified 
as a German permanent establishment, Germany would lose its tax jurisdiction in respect of 
these Austrian companies which in exchange received shares in the German GmbH. Under 
the German-Austrian tax treaty, and in line with Articles 7 and 13 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, before the reorganization the Austrian companies could be subject to tax in 
Germany in respect of their participations in the German limited partnership (GmbH & Co 
KG), which for tax purposes qualified as a German permanent establishment. But after the 
reorganization they could not be taxed in Germany in respect of the shares received in the 
German limited liability company. While similar domestic German reorganizations would be 
tax exempt, in this case the reorganization tax benefits did not apply since Germany would 
lose its power to tax the Austrian participants. In respect of the question whether this different 
treatment constituted an infringement of the fundamental freedoms, the Court ruled: 
‘60      It should be noted, at the outset, that it is proportionate for a Member State, for 
the purpose of safeguarding the exercise of its powers of taxation, to determine the 
tax due on the unrealised capital gains that have arisen in its territory at the time 
when its powers of taxation in respect of the investor in question cease to exist, 
namely, in the present case, at the time when the investor converts his interest in a 
limited partnership into shares in a capital company (see, to that effect, National Grid 
Indus, paragraph 52).’33 [emphasis added]. 
It was therefore allowed to impose a tax on the unrealized capital gains. Under the German 
provisions, the tax levied on the cross-border contribution of the partnership interest had to 
be paid in five annual installments without being required to pay interest. The second 
preliminary question was whether the collection of this exit tax in five installments infringed 
the fundamental freedoms.34 After having referred to the cases National Grid Indus and 
Commission vs. Portugal in which the Court had held that regarding ‘the collection of the tax 
due in respect of the unrealised capital gains (…) it is appropriate to give the taxable person 
                                                          
33
 ECJ case C-164/12 (DMC). 
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 In this case the free movement of capital of the participants was at stake. 
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a choice between, first, immediate payment of the amount of tax due (…) and, second, 
deferred payment of that tax’,35 the Court ruled: 
‘62      In that context, in the light of the fact that the risk of non-recovery increases 
with the passing of time, the ability to spread payment of the tax owing before the 
capital gains are actually realised over a period of five years constitutes a 
satisfactory and proportionate measure for the attainment of the objective of 
preserving the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member 
States.  
63      In the present case, the combined provisions of Paragraph 20(6) and the third 
to sixth sentences of Paragraph 21(2) of the UmwStG 1995 enable a taxable person 
to spread over a period of five years, without being required to pay interest, 
payment of the tax due in respect of the transfer of the shares which that person 
holds.  
64      Accordingly, by giving the tax payer the choice between immediate recovery or 
recovery spread over a period of five years, the legislation at issue in the main action 
does not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objective of the preservation of 
the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States.” 
[emphasis added]. 
The yearly installments were therefore considered to be proportionate. We can conclude 
that, although DMC does not concern a transfer of seat, from the Courts ruling it follows that 
the same principles from National Grid Indus apply in respect of the loss of jurisdiction 
caused by a cross-border contribution of a participation in a limited partnership. 
Consequently, the Court ruled that under the free movement of capital,36 the establishment of 
the amount of tax to be paid on the capital gains was justified, provided that Germany would 
actually lose its jurisdiction to tax the unrealized capital gains.37 Finally, tax collection in five 
annual installments without interest charges constitutes a justified and proportionate 
measure. 
4.2.3 Also in case of Transfers of Seat? 
The question rises whether payment in 5 installments is also proportionate and justified in 
case of a transfer of seat. Since the Court applies the same principles to transfers of seat 
and to cross-border contributions of participations, one might deduct that vice versa the 
outcome of the DMC ruling is also relevant for and can be applied to transfers of seat. That 
would lead to the conclusion that exit taxes levied on a transfer of seat and which are 
collected in five annual installments without charging interest are justified. If this conclusion is 
correct, DMC constitutes a major development in the Court’s case law on exit taxation. 
According to the case Commission vs. Denmark, which regards assets that are not meant to 
be disposed of after a transfer of seat, Member States could apply other collection-triggering-
events than the realization of the capital gains. In the DMC ruling, the Court of Justice rules 
                                                          
35
 ECJ case C-164/12 (DMC) para. 61. It is remarkable that the Court did not cite its conclusion of National Grid 
Indus until what moment that deferral should be granted, i.e. until the moment of realization of the capital 
gains. 
36
 The contribution by the limited partners of their participations concerns the exercise of the free movement 
of capital,  see ECJ case C-164/12 (DMC) para. 38. 
37
 ECJ case C-164/12 (DMC) para. 55. 
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that if Germany loses its tax jurisdiction in respect of the assets which after the contribution 
are fully owned by the German company, then the tax levied from the Austrian participants 
can be collected in five installments.  
The question rises why the ECJ did not simply apply its case law from National Grid Indus, 
and rule in DMC that the exit tax at hand could be levied at the moment of the contribution of 
the partnership participation, whereas the tax may only be collected when the Austrian 
shareholders dispose of the shares which they have received in exchange. Why did the ECJ 
deviate from National Grid Indus and did it allow Germany to collect the exit tax in five 
installments even if the Austrian shareholders had not yet actually realized their capital 
gains? In DMC, the ECJ is clearly less strict than in National Grid Indus. 
It is not crystal clear why tax collection in five installments is allowed in DMC. Does DMC 
constitute an application in practice of the doctrine laid down in Commission vs. Denmark? In 
other words, does the Court characterize participations in a limited partnership or shares in a 
GmbH as ‘assets which are not held for sale’, allowing Member States to determine an 
‘alternative collection-triggering-event’? 
Or does the ECJ generally consider the collection of exit taxes in five installments without 
interest payment as a proportionate and justified measure, irrespective of the question 
whether the assets involved are ‘assets which are not held for sale’? And does that apply to 
transfers of seat as well? In other words, should we consider the ruling in DMC as a further 
liberalization of the exit tax rules compared to Commission vs. Denmark?  
The Court does not answer these questions. It simply ruled that ‘in that context’, i.e. the 
context of an Austrian investor in respect of whom Germany loses its power to tax, and who 
is taxed ‘in respect of the transfer of the shares which that person holds’ in the German 
GmbH & Ko KG, and who is not ‘required to pay interest’, payment in five installments is 
proportionate.  
This all applies ‘in the light of the fact that the risk of non-recovery increases with the passing 
of time’.38 It is not clear whether the Court considers the risk of non-recovery particularly high 
in case of assets which are not meant to be disposed of, such as shares. That would be in 
contrast with the Courts’ case-law in respect of emigrating shareholders.39 
In par. 64 of DMC the Court seems to stipulate the criterion which exit taxes must meet in the 
case at hand: ‘giving the tax payer the choice between immediate recovery or recovery 
spread over a period of five years’. The Court concludes that the German rules meet that 
requirement and are proportionate. If payment of exit taxes in five installments without 
interest is generally a proportionate option, then some of the exit tax regimes recently 
introduced by Member States, which provide for the recovery of exit taxes in fixed 
installments after a seat transfer, seem to be justified as well. 
4.2.4 Various remarks 
Also if we should consider DMC as a further liberalization of the exit tax rules, the question 
remains where the line is between proportionate and disproportionate tax collection 
schemes. Are, for example, installment schemes of five years with interest payments, or tax 
collection in three or four annual installments proportionate as well? The liberalization of the 
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 ECJ case C-164/12 (DMC)  paras 61-63. 
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 ECJ case C-9/02 (Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant); ECJ case C-470/04 (N.). 
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exit tax rules in Commission vs. Denmark without providing a playing field with clear and 
certain rules has potentially opened the gateway to numerous court cases challenging the 
specific details of the exit tax provisions of the various Member States. 
Finally, it should be noted that in the DMC case the collection in five installments can only be 
justified if Germany actually loses its jurisdiction in respect of the capital gains.40  
‘56     However, the objective of preserving the balanced allocation of the powers to 
impose taxes between Member States can justify legislation such as that at issue in 
the main proceedings only where, in particular, the Member State in whose territory 
the income was generated is actually prevented from exercising its power of 
taxation in respect of such income.  
57      In the present case, it is not unquestionably clear from the facts of the main 
proceedings that the Federal Republic of Germany actually loses all power to tax 
unrealised capital gains on an interest in a partnership when that interest is 
exchanged in return for shares in a capital company. Indeed, the possibility would not 
appear to be precluded that such capital gains relating to the partnership interests 
contributed to the business assets of the capital company may be taken into account 
in determining the corporation tax payable in Germany by the acquiring company, 
namely in the present case DMC GmbH, which is a matter for the national court to 
establish.’ [emphasis added]. 
According to the Court, the exit tax at hand is not justified if Germany may tax the receiving 
German GmbH in respect of the capital gains relating to the partnership interests contributed. 
This is logic, because in that case nor the division of the power to tax between Member 
States nor the preservation of the coherence of the German national tax system is at stake. 
In the case at hand, before the contribution of the two participations, the two limited partners 
were entitled to part of the profits of the activities of the limited partnership, while the 
receiving GmbH was entitled to the other part of these profits. After the contribution the 
GmbH will be entitled to 100% of these profits.  
Whether the contribution results in the winding up of the limited partnership41 seems 
irrelevant, since also in that case the activities will be 100% for the account of the German 
GmbH. At first sight there is no reason to assume that Germany would lose its jurisdiction in 
respect of the assets of the German GmbH and those of the German GmbH & Co KG. 
Therefore, at first sight it seems that the German exit tax at hand cannot be justified. This is a 
matter to be decided by the German referring Court. 
4.2.5 Double Book Value Carry Over 
In fact, the case at hand is governed by Articles 20 and 21 of the German Reorganization 
Tax Act (Umwandlungssteuergesetz, further referred to as RTA). These Articles contain the 
general tax regime on the contribution of assets, i.e. on the contribution by a legal entity of 
one or more branches of activities to the receiving company in exchange for shares. This 
reorganization is generally referred to as an asset merger, or as a transfer of assets under 
Article 2(d) of the Merger Directive.42 If company A transfers its branch of activities to 
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 ECJ case C-164/12 (DMC) para. 55. 
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 ECJ case C-164/12 (DMC) para. 13. 
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 Since the GmbH & Co KG is a partnership it is not subject to tax itself in Germany. By contrast, its participants 
are subject to Income Tax or Corporate Income Tax in respect of their participation. Consequently, the Merger 
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company B in exchange for shares in company B, then Article 20 RTA provides that the 
transfer of the activities does not trigger taxation in respect of, among others, the unrealized 
capital gains of the activity transferred. Article 20 RTA requires, however, that receiving 
company B adopts the book value of the assets of company A in order to safeguard the tax 
claim. Furthermore, also company A which receives shares in company B must record those 
shares at the book value of the assets transferred, even if the market value of these shares 
is higher.  
                         
This system is called the double-book-value-carry-over (Doppelbuchwertverknüpfung)43 and 
brings about that the tax claim is doubled. After the contribution of assets, company B is 
taxed in respect of this capital gain if it disposes of the assets, while company A is, in 
principle, taxed on the same amount of capital gains that it realizes when it sells its shares in 
company B. Since Germany does not apply a 100% participation exemption in respect of 
capital gains on participations, this actually results in taxation in the hands of company A. 
Proposals to amend Article 9 of the Merger Directive with the aim to provide that the 
company (A) may record at market value the shares which it has received, were not 
adopted.44 Therefore, cross-border contributions of assets can result in double taxation. 
In DMC the Court cited the German tax rules of Article 20 RTA, which illustrates the German 
double book value carry over:45  
‘(1)       Where an undertaking, part of an undertaking or a partnership interest is 
transferred by way of contribution to a capital company subject to unlimited liability to 
corporation tax (…) and the transferor receives in consideration new shares in the 
company (…) the assets transferred and the new shares shall be valued in 
accordance with the following paragraphs (…) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Directive does not apply to the DMC case. The Merger Directive would have applied if an Austrian GmbH 
transfers a simple German permanent establishment to a German GmbH in exchange for shares. 
43
 See also ECJ case C-285/07 (A.T.) para. 13 with regard to the similar German Doppelbuchwertverknüpfung 
after an exchange of shares; see also ECJ case C-207/11 (3D I Srl) of a similar Italian provision on transfers of 
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(2)      The capital company may value the business assets contributed at their book 
value (…) 
(4)      The value which the capital company assigns to the business assets 
contributed shall be deemed for the transferor to be the transfer price and the 
acquisition cost of the shares.’ [emphasis added]. 
From para. 2 it follows that companies have the option for a tax exempt reorganization. In 
case of a tax exempt reorganization, paras. 2 and 4 provide that both the assets in the hands 
of the receiving company (DMC GmbH) and the shares in the hands of the transferring 
company (the Austrian companies) must be recorded at the original book value of the assets 
transferred. 
In DMC, under this German tax system under which the pre-reorganization tax claim is 
doubled, the post-reorganization tax claim in respect of the transferring (Austrian) companies 
was at stake, while the post-reorganization tax claim in respect of the German PE is taken 
over by the GmbH which, as receiving company, is obliged to record the former PE at the 
book value applied by the Austrian companies. Even if Germany loses its post-reorganization 
tax claims in respect of the Austrian shareholders, the tax claim in respect of the assets of 
the PE is actually transferred to the German receiving GmbH. Therefore, in my view, 
Germany does not ‘actually lose all power to tax unrealised capital gains on the interest in 
the partnership’ as required by the Court in order to justify the exit tax. Germany fully 
maintains a tax claim to that original amount. In my view, in the case at hand, the exit tax can 
therefore not be justified. It is a pity that the Advocate General did not conclude in this case 
and that also the Commission did not shed light on the question whether Germany would 
actually lose any tax claims in this case. 
Despite of the fact that in the case at hand the exit tax may not be justified, which is to be 
determined by the German referring court, the ECJ clearly ruled that if a Member State loses 
its tax jurisdiction in the case at hand, the exit tax may be collected in five annual 
installments. 
4.3 The Comparative Survey 
Table 3 demonstrates whether the 16 EU/EEA Member States that apply exit taxation in 
case of transfers of seat allow the deferral of tax collection until the moment of realization, in 
line with National Grid Indus, or whether they allow a scheme of tax collection in fixed annual 
installments. Also the three Member States of which it is unclear whether they apply exit 
taxation are included in the Table.  
In States where none of these two deferred tax collection schemes exists, it is clear that exit 
taxation constitutes a prohibited restriction of the freedom of establishment. As mentioned in 
para. 4.2, it is not fully clear yet whether an exit tax is proportionate if only the option of 
payment in fixed installments is offered as alternative for immediate payment. For the 
moment we assume that the Court generally allows the option to pay the exit tax in fixed 
installments (of five or more years) without charging interest. 
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Table 3  Tax Collection in respect of Unrealized Capital Gains after Transfers of Seat 
EU State 
 
 
 
Exit 
Taxation 
 
Deferral until 
Realization 
 
Payment in 
installments 
 
 
Potential 
Infringement 
 
Austria yes not always no 
 
yes 
Belgium yes no no 
 
yes 
Denmark yes no 7 years 
 
no 
Finland yes no no 
 
yes 
France yes no  5 years 
 
no 
Germany yes no 5 years 
 
no 
Greece not clear n.a. n.a. 
 
not clear 
Ireland yes yes 6 years 
 
no 
Italy yes yes 10 years 
 
no 
Lithuania not clear n.a. n.a. 
 
not clear 
Luxembourg yes No no 
 
yes 
The 
Netherlands yes Yes 10 years 
 
no 
Portugal yes Yes 5 years 
 
no 
Slovakia yes No no 
 
yes 
Spain yes Yes no 
 
no 
Sweden yes yes 5/10 years 
 
no 
United 
Kingdom yes yes 6 years 
 
no 
        
  EEA States       
  Iceland not clear no n.a. 
 
not clear 
Norway yes certain assets no 
 
yes 
N.A. stands for Not Applicable. 
 
Table 3 illustrates that of all 16 EU/EEA Member States that levy exit taxes, per January 1, 
2014, 7 States do not grant the option of deferral until realization. Austria and Norway do not 
always grant deferral until realization, while 7 States as a rule grant the option of deferral 
until realization.  
The option to pay the exit tax in fixed annual installments is offered by 9 States. The 
installments vary between 5, 6, 7 or 10 years. Under the German regime, depending of the 
type of assets involved, sometimes the exit tax is levied in 5 installments, and sometimes the 
exit tax is imposed immediately but collected in 5 installments.  
Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg and Slovakia did not offer any form of tax deferral and require 
exit taxes to be paid immediately. The same applies to Austria and Norway in respect of 
certain assets. The infringement of the freedom of establishment by these 6 States is not 
proportionate and can therefore not be justified.  
Finally, of 3 States (Greece, Lithuania and Iceland) it is not clear whether they apply exit 
taxes. These States do not provide for any specific rules on exit tax deferral. Therefore, if in 
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practice, these States should impose any exit taxes they would probably not grant tax 
deferral and consequently infringe the freedom of establishment. 
In National Grid Indus, the ECJ allowed Member States to defer the collection of exit tax until 
the moment that the capital gains are realized. The ECJ, however, fails to grant a definition 
of the concept of realization. Many Member States consider the capital gains to be realized in 
case of the sale or transfer of the assets to another taxpayer or abroad, outside the EU/EEA. 
Those events trigger the collection of the exit tax. Other States characterize the depreciation 
of the asset (The Netherlands) or the destruction of the asset (Norway) as a form of 
realization. To the extent that these events would also trigger the levy and collection of tax on 
unrealized capital gains in comparable domestic situations, it results in equal treatment and 
does not hamper the freedom of establishment.  
In the cases Commission vs. Denmark and DMC, the ECJ seems to liberalize its case law in 
respect of the moment of collection of exit taxes. The Court does no longer refer to an 
equivalent treatment in comparison to domestic situations. The ECJ allows to apply other 
criteria than realization and considers the collection in 5 annual installments as proportionate. 
Whether this results in an identical pace of tax collection as in domestic situations seems not 
crucial any more under these later rulings.  
Further important issues concerning the regime of deferred tax collection are the conditions 
under which deferral is granted, in particular the question whether taxpayers must provide 
guarantees and whether they must pay interest in respect of this deferral. These issues are 
treated in paragraphs 5 and 6. 
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5 The Requirement to provide Guaranties 
In National Grid Indus, the only tax obstacle that was at stake regarded the cash-flow 
disadvantage resulting from the immediate payment of the exit tax. Other obstacles to the 
freedom of establishment did not exist in the case at hand. Since the Netherlands tax laws 
did not provide for any tax deferral at all, obviously the taxpayer involved could not complain 
about any hypothetical conditions to obtain tax deferral. Consequently, in National Grid 
Indus, the referring Amsterdam Court of Appeal did not raise any preliminary questions 
regarding hypothetical conditions to obtain tax deferral, like guarantees or interest 
payments.46  
However, for the purpose of the present report, it should be examined whether, apart from 
cash flow disadvantages, also the requirement to provide guarantees in order to obtain tax 
deferral in respect of unrealized capital gains infringes the freedom of establishment. The 
question is whether exit tax legislation is disproportionate if taxpayers must provide 
guarantees in order to obtain tax deferral, keeping in mind the following words of the ECJ:  
‘36      It is also settled case-law that all measures which prohibit, impede or 
render less attractive the exercise of the freedom of establishment must be 
regarded as restrictions on that freedom’.47 [emphasis added]. 
In this respect it is important to remind what the ECJ ruled in National Grid Indus: 
38      That difference of treatment cannot be explained by an objective difference of 
situation. From the point of view of legislation of a Member State aiming to tax capital 
gains generated in its territory, the situation of a company incorporated under the 
law of that Member State which transfers its place of management to another Member 
State is similar to that of a company also incorporated under the law of the 
former Member State which keeps its place of management in that Member 
State, as regards the taxation of the capital gains relating to the assets which were 
generated in the former Member State before the transfer of the place of 
management.’ [emphasis added]. 
Companies transferring their seat must be compared with companies which do not transfer 
their seats. On the basis of this general rule, if a State does not require to provide 
guarantees in respect of unrealized capital gains in domestic situations, it would constitute a 
restriction of the freedom of establishment if such guarantees are required in respect of 
unrealized capital gains in occasion of a transfer of seat. 
In National Grid Indus, in a more specific consideration, the ECJ ruled that Member States 
should grant the option of a deferred collection of exit taxation and referred to the 
requirement to provide guarantees.  
‘74      However, account should also be taken of the risk of non-recovery of the 
tax, which increases with the passage of time. That risk may be taken into account 
by the Member State in question, in its national legislation applicable to deferred 
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 Hans van den Hurk, Harm van den Broek, Jasper Korving, Final settlement taxes for companies: Transfer of 
seat, interest charges, guarantees and step-ups, Bulletin for International Taxation, 2013/4-5, p. 260. 
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 ECJ case C-371/10 (National Grid Indus) para. 36. 
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payments of tax debts, by measures such as the provision of a bank guarantee.’48 
[emphasis added]. 
These words of the ECJ raised discussions in literature regarding the question whether this 
would mean that Member States are generally allowed to require guarantees in respect of 
the deferred collection of the exit tax.49  
Also in the later cases Commission vs. Portugal50 and in Commission vs. Netherlands51, the 
requirement to provide guarantees was not at stake52 and the European Commission did, at 
first hand, not explicitly raise any theoretical issues concerning that hypothetical issue. The 
problems of guarantees and interest resulted, however, in ´vivid discussions´53 during the 
hearing in Commission vs. Portugal. The Commission agreed with Denmark that, considering 
that no guarantees are required in domestic cases of unrealized capital gains, such a 
guarantee in respect of unrealized gains after a transfer of seat would hamper the freedom of 
establishment and could only be justified where there is a ‘genuine and proven risk of the 
non-recovery of tax’.54 
According to the Advocate General, in National Grid Indus the ECJ did not intend to give the 
Member States carte blanche to introduce the option of deferred payment together with the 
general condition to provide a bank guarantee. Also Advocate General Mengozzi held that 
such a guarantee could only be required if there was a genuine and serious risk of the non-
recovery of the tax claim.55 
In Arcade Drilling56, which regarded Norwegian exit taxation, the EFTA Court recognized that 
it would constitute a restriction of the freedom of establishment if a Member State would 
generally require guarantees as a condition to obtain deferred collection of exit taxes 
connected to a transfer of seat. According to the EFTA Court:  
‘101 (…)  the national authorities may take certain measures in order to 
secure the eventual payment of the amount of tax, provided that there is a 
genuine and proven risk of non-recovery.’ [emphasis added]. 
Therefore, according to the EFTA Court guarantees are only proportionate if there is an 
actual and proven risk of non-recovery. Guarantees cannot be required as general condition. 
However, since in none of these earlier cases the requirement to provide guarantees was 
actually at stake, the ECJ never gave a clear ruling about this issue. 
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Finally, in the DMC case, the ECJ had the occasion to rule on a case actually regarding the 
requirement to provide guarantees. In DMC the ECJ ruled that the general requirement in the 
German tax arrangement to provide guarantees in case of the loss of tax jurisdiction after a 
cross-border reorganization constitutes a restriction to the freedom of establishment.57 The 
Court ruled: 
’69 The national legislation of a Member State which provides for the immediate 
taxation of unrealised capital gains generated in its territory does not go beyond what 
is necessary (…) provided that, where the taxable person elects for deferred 
payment, the requirement to provide a bank guarantee is imposed on the basis 
of the actual risk of non-recovery of the tax.’  [emphasis added]. 
Consequently, in DMC, the ECJ held that the requirement to provide guarantees in 
connection with the option of deferral of tax collection in cross-border reorganizations is only 
proportionate in case of the actual risk of non-recovery. Although the DMC case did not 
regard a transfer of seat but instead a contribution of a participation, from the reasoning of 
the ECJ, which systematically refers to the National Grid Indus ruling, it follows that the 
principles laid down in DMC also apply to transfers of seat. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that also in case of a transfer of seat, Member States are only allowed to request a 
guarantee in respect of exit taxes ‘on the basis of the actual risk of non-recovery of the tax.’ 
This requires a risk assessment on a case by case basis and precludes to require 
guarantees in case there is no particular risk of non-recovery. 
The question is therefore whether the exit tax rules adopted by the EU/EEA Member States 
after the National Grid Indus ruling in 2011, and taking into account the DMC case in 2014, 
are in line with the case law of the ECJ. Table 4 provides an overview of the rules of the 
Member States with regard to the requirement to provide guarantees. 
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Table 4  The Requirement to provide Guarantees after Transfer of Seat  
EU State 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Guarantees 
generally 
required after a 
transfer of seat re 
unrealized capital 
gains 
 
Guarantees 
generally required in 
domestic cases of 
unrealized capital 
gains 
 
 
Potential 
Infringement 
 
 
 
 
 
Austria no no no 
Belgium n.a. no no 
Bulgaria n.a. no no 
Croatia n.a. n.a. no 
Cyprus n.a. n.a. no 
Czech 
Republic n.a. n.a. no 
Denmark n.a. no no 
Estonia n.a. no no 
Finland no no no 
France n.a. no no 
Germany risk assessment no no 
Greece n.a. n.a. no 
Hungary n.a. no no 
Ireland no no no 
Italy yes no yes 
Latvia n.a. n.a. no 
Lithuania n.a. n.a. no 
Luxembourg n.a. no no 
Malta n.a. no no 
The 
Netherlands risk assessment no no 
Poland n.a. n.a. no 
Portugal n.a. n.a. no 
Romania n.a. n.a. no 
Slovakia n.a. n.a. no 
Slovenia no no no 
Spain yes no yes 
Sweden no no no 
United 
Kingdom risk assessment no no 
        
EEA State       
Iceland n.a. no no 
Norway No no no 
N.A. stands for Not Applicable. 
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From Table 4 it follows that not a single EU/EEA Member State requires from domestic 
companies which do not exercise their freedom of establishment to provide guarantees in 
respect of their unrealized capital gains.  
From Table 4 it follows that only 2 states systematically require to provide guarantees as a 
condition to obtain deferred tax collection after a transfer of seat. These States are Italy and 
Spain. If we assume that the ruling of DMC in respect of the obligation to provide guarantees 
also applies to transfers of seat, then the legislation of these two States is contrary to the 
freedom of establishment. Unfortunately, on 10 July 2014, the European Commission has 
withdrawn its infringement procedure against Spain.58  
Other States assess the risk of non-recovery on a case by case basis. Germany requires 
guarantees on a case by case basis. In The Netherlands the law allows tax inspectors to 
require guarantees in all situations and this would as such not be in line with the DMC ruling. 
However, the recently published policy of the Dutch Tax Administration provides that the Tax 
Administration takes into account the actual risk of non-recovery. In the United Kingdom, 
guarantees are only required in case of a serious risk of non-recovery. These regimes seem 
to be in line with the requirements of the ECJ if also in practice the obligation to provide 
guarantees depends on the actual risk of non-recovery which must be assessed on a case 
by case basis. 
It is to be expected that the Member States which apply exit taxes and which have not yet 
introduced any tax deferral regime connected to seat transfers will do so in the near future. It 
would be useful to monitor to what extent these States will require taxpayers to provide 
guarantees in respect of exit taxes and to what extent these provisions are in line with the 
DMC ruling. 
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6 Interest Charges 
Another tax obstacle, apart from the above mentioned obstacles which have been 
characterized by the ECJ as infringements of the freedom of establishment, can be 
constituted by the obligation to pay interest in respect of the exit tax which is not collected 
immediately after the transfer of seat.  
As mentioned above, restrictions are ‘all measures which prohibit, impede or render less 
attractive the exercise of the freedom of establishment’.59 Furthermore, a company 
transferring its seat must be compared with ‘a company also incorporated under the law of 
the former Member State which keeps its place of management in that Member State’.60  
Usually, companies which keep their place of management in the same Member State are 
not obliged to pay interest in respect of the unrealized capital gains connected to their 
assets. Therefore, if a state charges interest in respect of the deferred collection of exit taxes 
after a transfer of seat, there is a difference in treatment compared to similar domestic 
situations. Without any doubt the obligation to pay interest regarding the latent tax claim on 
unrealized capital gains makes it less attractive to transfer the seat to another Member State. 
If companies do not transfer their seat they must not pay any interest connected to the tax 
claims in respect of the unrealized capital gains. On the basis of this general rule established 
by the ECJ one should conclude that interest charges in respect of exit taxes connected to a 
transfer of seat constitute a prohibited infringement of the freedom of establishment. 
Until now, the ECJ did not yet have the opportunity to rule on a case in which such interest 
charges were actually at stake. In the cases in which the ECJ in general terms referred to the 
possibility of charging interest in connection with exit taxes, in particular in National Grid 
Indus, the Member States involved did not actually charge interest on the exit tax. The 
Member States involved did not even offer the possibility of deferred tax collection.  
In National Grid Indus the ECJ ruled in general terms as follows: 
‘73     In those circumstances, national legislation offering a company transferring its 
place of effective management to another Member State the choice between, first, 
immediate payment of the amount of tax, which creates a disadvantage for that 
company in terms of cash flow but frees it from subsequent administrative burdens, 
and, secondly, deferred payment of the amount of tax, possibly together with 
interest in accordance with the applicable national legislation, (…) would 
constitute a measure which, while being appropriate for ensuring the balanced 
allocation of powers of taxation between the Member States, would be less harmful to 
freedom of establishment than the measure at issue in the main proceedings (…).’ 
[emphasis added]. 
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As pointed out by Advocate General Mengozzi61 and as it clearly follows from the DMC 
ruling, in National Grid Indus the ECJ ‘did not intend to grant Member States carte blanche in 
respect of the obligation to provide guarantees and the requirement to pay interest charges’ 
in respect of the deferred collection of exit taxes.  
The European Commission repeatedly held that charging interest in respect of deferred 
collection of exit taxes is ‘intrinsically discriminatory’, for example in Commission vs. 
Portugal:62    
‘73.      (…) the Commission considers that charging interest for late payment is 
intrinsically discriminatory since resident taxpayers are asked to pay tax only 
subsequently, without interest (…)’ [emphasis added]. 
Also in more recent cases, like Commission vs. Denmark, the European Commission 
repeated its view that the charging of interest infringes the freedom of establishment:63  
'19  The Commission considers that it would not comply with the requirement of 
proportionality to require a bank guarantee or payment of interest (…).’ [emphasis 
added]. 
Advocate General Mengozzi does not agree with this view. According to the Advocate 
General64 in Commission vs. Portugal, in respect of interest payments, a company 
transferring its seat must not be compared with a domestic company that does not transfer 
its seat:  
’74.      With regard to interest (…) I note that a number of Member States apply 
interest, sometimes classified as ‘interest for late payment’, on the amount of the tax 
claims of their taxpayers, including where deferred payment of the tax debt is 
authorised. Although I am not certain, this is, I think, the situation to which the 
clarification made by the Court in paragraph 73 of the abovementioned judgment 
in National Grid Indus relates. 
75.      In my view, the Commission’s criticism regarding the discriminatory 
character of such a requirement cannot be accepted. 
76  If, in a domestic situation where a place of management is transferred, such 
interest is not demanded, this is simply because the amount of the tax debt will be 
ascertained and therefore payable only upon the effective realisation of the capital 
gains. (…) By contrast, because, in a cross-border situation, the Member States are 
authorised, as is confirmed in the abovementioned judgment in National Grid Indus, 
to fix the amount of the tax debt payable in connection with unrealised capital gains 
relating to assets of a company transferring its place of management to another 
Member State at the time of that transfer, but the actual payment is deferred, the 
interest payable on that amount may be treated in the same way as interest 
payable on a loan granted to that company. 
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77.      Consequently, and in accordance with the principle of equivalence, if, in its 
national legislation generally applicable to the recovery of tax claims, a Member State 
provides that the option of deferred payment comes together with interest, there is no 
objective reason to exclude from it the situation of a company transferring its place of 
management to a Member State, whose tax debt in the Member State of exit was 
ascertained at the time of that transfer.’ [emphasis added]. 
Therefore, where the ECJ has ruled with regard to certain aspects of the exit tax, such as the 
moment of collection of the exit tax and the requirement to provide guarantees, that a 
company transferring its seat to another Member State must be compared with a domestic 
company with unrealized gains, the Advocate General holds that with regard to another 
aspect of the exit tax, i.e. the payment of interest, seat transfers must by contrast not be 
compared to a domestic company with unrealized capital gains. Apparently, according to the 
Advocate General, a company transferring its seat must be compared with a domestic 
company that actually has realized its profits and that has received a tax assessment in 
respect of those profits. In the words of the Advocate General, it must be compared with 
‘interest payable on a loan granted to that company.’ One may doubt whether this approach 
is consistent and whether it is in line with the case law of the ECJ. According to the ECJ, the 
exit tax must be compared with domestic situations in which no tax assessment is imposed 
on unrealized gains. And the Courts decision in National Grid Indus that an exit tax may not 
be collected until the moment of realization is exactly based on the comparison with domestic 
situations in which the tax on capital gains is only collected after these gains are realized. 
The Advocate General therefore denies the fact that the ECJ has established that exit 
taxation must be compared to domestic situations in which no tax assessment is imposed on 
unrealized capital gains. The Advocate General, however, admits that he is not certain.  
Moreover, even if the company should be compared with a domestic company with realized 
gains, then still no interest could be charged in most situations of a transfer of seat. We 
assume that in most Member States interest can only be charged in domestic situations in 
which the taxpayer can be forced to pay the tax assessment without further deferral, while no 
interest is due if the assessment has been imposed but the taxpayer cannot yet be forced to 
pay the tax assessment. Since the ECJ has ruled that the taxpayer cannot be forced to pay 
the exit tax immediately, this would mean that there can be no interest charge either. So 
therefore, even under the interpretation of the Advocate General, interest could be charged 
only from the moment that the capital gains have been realized65 and the exit tax can be 
collected. 
In order to grasp the relevance of interest charges on exit taxes, we will illustrate this with the 
example of National Grid Indus. The tax claim at issue in National Grid Indus regarded the 
amount of 3.5 million euro to be paid in respect of the unrealized capital gains on a 
receivable in British pounds.66 Let us assume that the loan would be paid back by the debtor 
10 years after the transfer of the seat. That means that after ten years the capital gain on the 
receivable is realized and the exit tax must be paid. The Netherlands charges companies (at 
least) 8% of interest per annum on tax deferral. This means that 10 years after its cross-
border transfer of seat, when the loan is paid back, a company like National Grid Indus has 
to pay 3.5 million euro of tax plus a total amount of interest of 2.8 million euro (10 x 8% of 3.5 
                                                          
65
 Or from the moment that the installment payments are actually due. 
66
 ECJ case C-371/10 (National Grid Indus) para. 12, indicates that the capital gain amounted up to 22 mln NLG, 
which is 10 mln EURO, whereas the Dutch Corporate Income Tax rate in 2000 was 35%. 
40 
 
million euro). By contrast, if National Grid Indus would not have transferred its seat abroad, 
the company would only have to pay 3.5 million euro of tax at the moment of realization of 
the capital gains. This example demonstrates that the charging of interest on deferred exit 
taxes is a major burden to the exercise of the freedom of establishment.  
Finally, there seems to be no justification for the charging of the interest. It infringes the 
principle of equivalence compared to the treatment of domestic companies. Furthermore, 
interest payments are certainly not helpful or necessary to obtain the per se justified 
objective of safeguarding the balanced allocation of taxing rights between Member States or 
the coherence of the tax system. The Court of Justice has not accepted any other 
justifications in respect of transfers of seat. 
Consequently, we conclude that charging interest in respect of deferred collection of exit 
taxes constitutes a prohibited infringement of the freedom of establishment that cannot be 
justified. 
As Table 5 indicates, the problem of interest charges occurs in many EU/EEA Member 
States. 
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Table 5  The Requirement to pay Interest after a Transfer of Seat 
 
EU State 
 
 
 
 
 
Interest 
Charges after 
Transfer of 
Seat? 
 
 
Interest Charges 
on Domestic 
Unrealized Capital 
Gains? 
 
 
Potential 
Infringement 
 
 
 
Austria no no no 
Belgium n.a. no no 
Bulgaria n.a. no no 
Croatia n.a. n.a. no 
Cyprus n.a. n.a. no 
Czech 
Republic n.a. n.a. no 
Denmark yes no yes 
Estonia n.a. no no 
Finland no  no no 
France n.a. no no 
Germany no no no 
Greece n.a. n.a. no 
Hungary n.a. no no 
Ireland yes no yes 
Italy 
yes 
(installments) no yes (installm) 
Latvia n.a. n.a. no 
Lithuania n.a. n.a. no 
Luxembourg n.a. no no 
Malta n.a. no no 
The 
Netherlands yes no yes 
Poland n.a. n.a. no 
Portugal yes n.a. yes 
Romania n.a. n.a. no 
Slovakia n.a. n.a. no 
Slovenia no no no 
Spain yes no yes 
Sweden no no no 
United 
Kingdom yes no yes 
        
EEA States       
Iceland n.a. no no 
Norway yes no yes 
N.A. stands for Not Applicable. 
 
From Table 5 it follows that none of the EU/EEA Member States charges interest in respect 
of unrealized capital gains in domestic situations.  
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By contrast, Table 5 illustrates that 7 EU/EEA Member States (Denmark, Ireland, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and Norway) generally charge interest in 
respect of the deferred collection of exit taxes. Furthermore, Italy charges interest if 
taxpayers opt for payment of the exit tax in installments, but not if taxpayers opt for payment 
at the moment of realization.  
Therefore, assuming that charging of interest cannot be justified, we must conclude that the 
interest provisions of at least 8 EU/EEA Member States infringe the freedom of 
establishment. Unfortunately, on 20 November 2013, the European Commission has 
withdrawn its infringement procedure against The Netherlands.67 At this moment, the 
European Commission does not seem to act against this type of infringement. 
As mentioned before, several Member States have not yet introduced any tax deferral 
regime connected to exit taxes and are still obliged to do so. It would be useful to monitor to 
what extent these States will oblige taxpayers to pay interest in respect of the deferred 
collection of exit taxes. 
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7 Summary and Conclusions 
The vast majority of the EU and EEA Member States (22 States) applies the incorporation 
system. Only 7 states adhere to the real seat system. Companies from the latter 7 states 
might be obliged to liquidate if they transfer their real seat to another State. In that case, they 
cannot rely on the freedom of establishment in respect of transfers of seat, unless these 
companies are converted into companies governed by the company law of the host state.  
In practice, not a single state generally taxes unrealized capital gains of companies in 
domestic situations at the end of a fiscal year. By means of exception, a few Member States 
levy tax on very specific unrealized capital gains in domestic situations. By contrast, 16 
EU/EEA Member States tax unrealized capital gains upon a seat transfer whereas these 
unrealized gains would not have been taxed in domestic situations. These 16 states 
potentially restrict the freedom of establishment. Furthermore, a remarkable number of 10 
Member States does not levy any form of exit tax on unrealized capital gains in case of a 
transfer of seat. Finally, in the case of Greece, Lithuania and Iceland it is not clear whether 
the general principles of their tax laws would result in exit taxation.  
Of all 16 EU/EEA Member States that levy exit taxes, per January 1, 2014, not less than 7 
States68 do not grant the option of deferral until realization as required by the ECJ in National 
Grid Indus. Furthermore, 7 States grant the option of deferral until realization. Two States, 
Austria and Norway offer that option only with regard to certain assets. 
The option to pay the exit tax in fixed annual installments is offered by 9 States. The 
installments vary between 5, 6, 7 or 10 years. In the cases Commission vs. Denmark and 
DMC, the ECJ allows to apply other criteria for collection of exit tax than the realization of the 
actual capital gains. The ECJ generally seems to consider the collection in 5 annual 
installments as proportionate. It is not completely sure yet whether payment in installments 
can also be required in respect of assets which are usually disposed of. 
Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg and Slovakia did not offer any form of relief and require exit 
taxes to be paid immediately. The same applies to Austria and Norway in respect of certain 
assets. The infringement of the freedom of establishment by these 6 States cannot be 
justified. 
With regard to the conditions to obtain deferred tax collection special attention should be 
given to the requirement to provide guarantees and to interest charged by States in respect 
of tax deferral. 
Only 2 states, Italy and Spain, systematically require to provide guarantees in order to obtain 
deferred tax collection after a transfer of seat. Assuming that the DMC ruling, in which the 
ECJ ruled that guarantees can only be required in case of an actual and proven risk of non-
recovery, also applies to transfers of seat, then these two States infringe the freedom of 
establishment. Furthermore, Germany, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom require 
guarantees on the basis of a case by case risk assessment, which seems to be in line with 
the DMC ruling.  
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The ECJ has not yet ruled in a case in which a Member State charged interest in respect of 
the deferred collection of exit tax, but we strongly agree with the view of the European 
Commission that in general charging interest after a transfer of seat infringes the freedom of 
establishment.  
None of the EU/EEA Member States charges interest in respect of unrealized capital gains in 
domestic situations. By contrast, 7 EU/EEA Member States (Denmark, Ireland, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and Norway) generally charge interest in 
respect of the deferred collection of exit taxes. Furthermore, Italy charges interest if 
taxpayers opt for payment of the exit tax in installments. These states seem to infringe the 
freedom of establishment.  
It is to be expected that the Member States which have not yet introduced any tax deferral 
regime connected to exit taxes will do so in the near future. It would be useful to monitor to 
what extent these States will require taxpayers to provide guarantees and whether they 
charge interest in respect of deferral of exit taxes. 
Table 6 contains the conclusions as to whether the exit tax rules of each EU/EEA Member 
State infringe the freedom of establishment. It illustrates that in 2014 the exit tax laws of at 
least 13 EU/EEA Member States are still not in line with the freedom of establishment. 
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Table 6 Conclusions concerning Exit Taxation in the EU/EEA  
  
 
Infringement of the Freedom of Establishment  
by Exit Tax Regimes 
 
 
EU State 
 
 
 
 
 
Lack of Tax 
Deferral or 
Payment in 
Installments 
 
 
Guarantees are 
Generally 
Required 
 
Interest is 
Charged 
Austria Yes   
Belgium Yes   
Bulgaria 
 
  
Croatia 
 
  
Cyprus 
 
  
Czech 
Republic 
 
  
Denmark 
 
 Yes 
Estonia 
 
  
Finland Yes   
France 
 
  
Germany 
 
  
Greece Not clear   
Hungary 
 
  
Ireland 
 
 Yes 
Italy 
 
Yes Yes 
Latvia 
 
  
Lithuania Not clear   
Luxembourg Yes   
Malta 
 
  
The 
Netherlands 
 
 Yes 
Poland 
 
  
Portugal 
 
 Yes 
Romania 
 
  
Slovakia Yes   
Slovenia 
 
  
Spain 
 
Yes Yes 
Sweden 
 
  
United 
Kingdom 
 
 Yes 
      
EEA States     
Iceland Not clear   
Norway Yes  Yes 
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